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The Online Discussion Forum
of the Canadian Naval Review
We have created this Discussion Forum to encourage timely and informed discussion of current issues of interest to those in the Canadian and international defence and maritime security community. We believe strongly that this concept of a maritime-oriented policy forum is in keeping with the educational and public outreach mandate of the Canadian Naval Review.
Announcement:
The (IMO) has chosen the theme for World Maritime Day 2010 to be “The Year of the Seafarer". The exact date is left to individual Governments but is usually celebrated during the last week in September. It will be celebrated at the IMO’s headquarters on Thursday, 23 September 2010. You can read a message from the IMO’s secretary-general here.
Announcement:
The Canadian Naval Review will be holding its annual essay competition, the Bruce S. Oland Essay Competition, again in 2010. There will be two prizes for the best essays - a first prize of $1,000.00 and a second prize of $500.00. The winning essays will be published in CNR. The first prize will be provided by Mr. Richard Oland in memory of his father Commodore Bruce S. Oland, and the second prize will be provided by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University.
Announcement:
The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies is pleased to provide the 'Professional Digest' produced by the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre's LCdr. (ret.) Doug Thomas. The digests will appear under the CFPS homepage on tab for Maritime Security Policy. You can reach the page here.
The Digest is produced weekly as "a selection of topical articles and opinions for busy maritime warriors." As Doug advises, "most Digest items have been condensed - please go to the attached link if you wish more detail." He welcomes your comments and suggestions. He can be contacted by email at: Doug.Thomas@forces.gc.ca.
Ken Hansen, Forum Moderator
Announcing New Publications from the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies:
Geopolitics vs. Global Governance: Reinterpreting International Security
Edited by Sabrina Hoque
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Breaking the Box: The Increasing Demands of Non-Combat Roles on Maritime Forces
Edited by Kenneth P. Hansen
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US Nuclear Strategy and the Implications for Global Security
Edited by David S. McDonough
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New Issues in Security #3
State-Society Relations in Uganda: The Search for Security, Development and State Legitimacy
By Jordan Guthrie
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Announcement:
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States has released its report - "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World." This is their 4th unclassified report that gives a long-term view of the future.
- Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
- Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project
- Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Non-government Experts
- Global Trends 2010
Announcement:
Back Issues of CNR
Are you missing an issue of CNR for your collection? Would you like copies of CNR to put on your coffee table?
Back issues of CNR are now available. If you would like a copy of any of the five glorious years of CNR issues, copies are now available for $5.00. Contact us at naval.review@dal.ca and we'll have the issues mailed to you.
Wednesday, Feb 03 2010
Canada and the Disaster in Haiti
The flexibility of amphibious logistical capacity.
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
Dave Shirlaw, Editor and Publisher of “SeaWaves” Magazine, reports that NDCC Almirante Sabóia (pictured above) of the Brazilian navy left for Haiti on February 1st. (Photo courtesy of SeaWaves.)
This vessel was originally RFA Sir Bedivere (pennant L3004), a member of the British Round Table-Class Landing Ships – Logistic (LSL). She was built between 1965 and 1967 by Hawthorn Leslie and extensively updated between 1994 and 1998 at Rosyth. The refit included new engines. Sir Bedivere was due to decommission in 2011, but was sold three years early to the Brazilian Navy.
Sir Bedivere was designed for logistical support of amphibious warfare missions, but not for amphibious assault. She has both bow and stern doors leading onto the main vehicle deck, making them roll-on/roll-off capable. There are two vehicle decks. In addition, the ship is able to beach herself to enable unloading in the absence of dock facilities. They also have a 20-tonne crane forward of the superstructure for lifting on and off equipment. There are two helicopter landing pads, one forward and one aft of the superstructure, permiting loading supplies for aerial delivery.
The LSL’s main capabilities are:
- Administrative transport of troops, vehicles and equipment.
- Facilities to carry ammunition.
- Repair of vehicles.
- Transportation of other miscellaneous equipment.
- Landing of vehicles and supplies using two ‘Mexeflote’ self-propelled rafts.
Almirante Sabóia (Sir Bedivere) displaces 6,700 tonnes at full load. She is 137 metres long, is 20 meters in breadth, and draws 4.0 metres at full load. The ship has an endurance of 9,200 miles at 15 knots (fuel load unknown) and has a maximum speed of 17 knots. The crew complement totals 49 persons. The troop accommodation capacity is 340 plus 34 vehicles of mixed types (or 18 ‘main battle’ tanks). The ship can carry 120 tons of fuel, oil and lubricants for the cargo vehicles and 30 tons of ammunition. The suitability of this type of ship for disaster relief duties off Haiti, where the main port faculties have been extensively damaged, is obvious
Whereas the warfighting capabilities of amphibious ships are most often emphasized, the diplomatic value of being able to dispatch rapid response marine units should not be underestimated. Whereas discussions about the development of a marine amphibious capability usually revolve around a combat unit for assault missions, a number of countries have chosen instead to develop administrative capabilities instead. In my paper, “Marines: Which Countries have them and Why,” of the 43 countries that possess either marines or naval infantry organizations, I identified eight with a marine ‘support’ organizations and four with marine engineering capabilities. Perhaps a rapid-response marine engineering unit is better suited as a first step into developing a marine organization in this new security environment. It would be flexible enough for useful employment in all three naval roles (military, constabulary and diplomatic).
Initial post on Jan 28 2010 | 2 comments | Last comment on Feb 03 2010
Tuesday, Feb 02 2010
The Canadian Naval Centennial
Twenty-Five ‘moments’ to celebrate (or ponder).
By “Sprog”
To commemorate the Canadian Naval Centennial, and to provoke debate on our navy’s history, I have compiled a list of twenty-five significant moments that capture what I consider to be the major events and trends of the past 100 years. Some are facts, the importance of which can be disputed, while others are subjective observations, which may rankle; and, of course, there may be some items from both categories - and indeed the categories themselves – that you may think have been overlooked. So there is room for debate. Note, however, that I fully appreciate that people form the heart of any navy, and next month will submit a list of 25 significant individuals from the navy’s first 100 years. In the meantime, let’s have some fun, so ‘return fire’ with full or partial Broadsides!
Institutional Moments
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1. The Naval Service Act: received Royal Assent on 4 May 1910.
2. The Naval Reserves: establishment of the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve [on 31 January 1923] and the RCN Reserve [also ‘on or about’ the same date in 1923].
[Moderator’s Note: both were merged on 1 January 1946 to form the Royal Canadian Navy Reserve.]
3. Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command: created on 30 April 1943.
4. The Unification Quagmire: the first exercise in transformation
[Moderator’s Note: Liberal Defence Minister Paul Hellyer introduced legislation to amalgamate the Navy, Army and Air Force as the Canadian Armed Forces on 4 November 1966. The bill became law on 1 February 1968.]
5. Battle of the Atlantic Sunday.
Operational Moments
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6. Recognition long overdue: the steady, unspectacular work of the First World War anti-submarine trawler force. When the RN and USN turned their backs on agreements to help defend Canadian waters against German submarines, the RCN’s trawlers held the line in much the same way that corvettes did in the early 1940s.
7. Three wartime firsts:
(1) - 11 June 1940, the destroyer HMCS St Laurent engages German artillery at St Valery-en-Caux, firing the first shots in anger by a Canadian warship;
(2) - 16 November 1940, the navy claims its first enemy warship when the destroyer HMCS Ottawa helps to destroy the Italian submarine Faa di Bruno in the North Atlantic; and, finally,
(3) - 19 September 1941, the corvette HMCS Levis becomes the first Canadian warship lost to enemy action torpedoed in the North Atlantic [ by U-74].
8. Establishing the ‘Away Game’; the Mackenzie King government dispatches three destroyers to British waters in May 1940 proclaiming the defence of Canada began at the English Channel, initiating a tradition of timely, effective deployments - not ‘grandstands’ - such as to Korea in 1950 and to the Arabian Gulf in 1990 and 2001.
9. Three time a ‘Sturdy Ally’:
(1) - June 1944, some 126 Canadian warships and 10,000 sailors contribute to Operation NEPTUNE;
(2) - October-November, 1962, the RCN’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis; and
(3) - March 1968, HMCS Gatineau becomes the first Canadian warship to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), initiating an enduring contribution to the NATO squadron.
10. Two under-appreciated wartime accomplishments:
(1) - the work of RCN minesweepers in Operation NEPTUNE, who in a few months transformed themselves from rag-tag anti-submarine escort vessels into an effective mine-clearing force that led American forces across the English Channel into OMAHA Beach; and
(2) - the contribution of the Operational Intelligence Centre in Ottawa to the Allied intelligence network that played a major role in sealing victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.
11. The Korean War: the superb performance of RCN destroyers in a variety of missions shook the navy out its post-Second World War doldrums and emphasized the requirement of keeping a measure of general purpose capability in an anti-submarine warfare-focused navy.
12. The Navy and the North: during the summer of 1954, HMCS Labrador became the first warship and the first deep draft ship to transit the Northwest Passage, beginning three seasons of valuable activity in the Arctic.
13. The Navy and Peacekeeping: Responding to an international emergency in impressive time, the aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent transports the Canadian field component of the United Nations Expeditionary Force (UNEF) to Suez (December 1955-January 1956), setting the standard for similar responses in the future.
14. Naval Aviation: First arrested landings of Tracker and Banshee aircraft on HMCS Bonaventure (5-6 April 1957) marking the air branch’s maturity into a potent anti-submarine warfare force in a relatively short time. Unfortunately, the carrier’s small size made it difficult to operate both types of aircraft simultaneously in sufficient numbers.
15. The destroyer-helicopter marriage: The relationship is ‘consummated’ with the first deck and haul-down trials of a Sea King helicopter onboard HMCS Assiniboine in November-December 1963. In a case where bare necessity drove innovation, the navy found a way to get large, dual-purpose anti-submarine helicopters to sea.
16. The ‘One Stop Shopping’ concept: during trials in July 1964, the new Canadian replenishment ship Provider transfers oil, supplies and ammunition to the destroyer escort HMCS Yukon while making 20 knots.
17. The Silent Service (some would say ‘forgotten’): During the mid-1980s the three Oberon-class submarines conducted successful surveillance patrols against Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) transiting Canadian waters, and over the course of their history carried out many other missions still unheralded.
18. Two unique missions:
(1) - the trawler Thiepval’s support to the 1924 ‘Round the World Flight’ (with an intelligence mission to snoop on American and Japanese activity in the Pacific), and
(2) - the destroyer Iroquois’ guarding of the North Atlantic cable during the 1976 Olympic summer games.
Procurement Moments
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19. Best procurement decision: hands-down the St Laurent-class destroyer escorts. The right type of ship, at the right price.
20. Most successful design: the jury of history will be out for some time but perhaps the Halifax-class Canadian Patrol Frigate will prove even more successful than the St Laurents in terms of utility over time.
21. Greatest opportunity missed: the 1959 nuclear submarine proposal. Expensive, yes; but affordable and workable with changes to the navy’s force structure. It would have put the navy on the ground floor of operating the most effective weapons system of the age.
22. Two ‘Best Roads’ NOT taken:
(1) - the General Purpose Frigate program of the early 1960s (an attempt to cram too much into one hull); and
(2) - the nuclear submarine project of the late 1980s (by then too expensive with little wriggle room in the force structure).
Miscellaneous Moments
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23. Five technological game changers:
(1) - Canadian anti-acoustic torpedo (CAT) gear [aka CAAT gear];
(2) - Canadian Variable Depth Sonar (VDS);
(3) - Canadian BEARTRAP helicopter haul-down system;
(4) - Canadian towed array surveillance system (CANTASS); and
(5) - Canadian Shipboard Integrated Naval Communications System (SHINCOM).
24. The role of mutiny in engendering change: In an ever-growing number of ‘incidents’ throughout the 1940s, the corvette Matapedia can now be added to the list. The sometimes premeditated, sometimes spur of the moment protests by Canadian sailors hastened the evolution of attitudes and personnel policies in the RCN. An engine of social change not replicated in any other navy.
25. Three Perplexing Descriptors:
(1) - We had one ‘Golden Age’ - the mid-1950s into the 1960s, when the RCN boasted a premier ASW force - but now another - expanded from Operation APOLLO to refer to the current era in general - has been proclaimed. Isn’t one enough for a small, young navy? And should such pronunciations even be made before the period has been exposed to objective light? Interestingly, neither so-called ‘Golden Age’ involved combat.
(2) - The use of the term ‘Sheep Dog Navy’ to describe the Battle of the Atlantic escort force, thus colouring one of the harshest theatres of the war with a peaceful, pastoral hue.
(3) - Using “Rust Out” as a general description of the lean 1970s and 80s when the St Laurent-class were running down. Fair enough, but name a period in the navy’s history when that has not been an issue with a major class of Canadian warships?
Initial post on Feb 02 2010 | 0 comments
Monday, Feb 01 2010
Piracy
A profitable situation – for both sides?
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
The February 2010 issue of SEAPOWER in its section entitled “Intercepts” (p. 10) contains the following comment by Jan Fritz Hansen, Vice President of the Danish Shipowners’ Association:
“The waters east of Africa are a grey zone because developing countries don’t have resources to fight pirates. It’s a temporary solution that a shipper has hired a warship from another country, but there’s no alternative.”
The comment by the TDC (Maritime) analyst (cited in my 25 January post) that the dissatisfaction expressed last week by the Hong Kong Shipowners’ Association with the current anti-piracy effort “will resonate across the shipping industry” appears to have at least one other supporting voice.
However, the notion that naval forces are ‘for hire’ raises an entirely new dimension to the question of how to provide marine security in danger zones.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 13 comments | Last comment on Feb 02 2010
Monday, Feb 01 2010
Canada and the Disaster in Haiti
A Few Words From Off The Coast of Haiti
Peter Crain, Commander, Commanding Officer, HMCS ATHABASKAN
You can find the pdf file of this comment here.
Initial post on Jan 28 2010 | 2 comments | Last comment on Feb 03 2010
Thursday, Jan 28 2010
Canada and the Disaster in Haiti
Naval Support to Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Assistance?
Doug Thomas
f the Canadian navy had possessed a large ship available to deploy in the case of such incidents as the Haitian Earthquake: an AOR, JSS, Large Deck Amphib, or a RoRo Vessel taken up from trade, it could have taken huge quantities of building supplies, mechanized vehicles such as bull dozers, back-hoes, 4 Wheel Drive SUVs, and landing craft, al of which would have greatly increased the capability of sea-borne and sea-based assistance to the Haitian people. In 1992, HMC Ships Preserver and Protecteur were deployed from Halifax with construction materials and vehicles, the Naval Construction Troop, and their ships' companies of skilled technicians to the Bahamas and to Florida after major hurricanes.
Large ships: purpose-built naval vessels or perhaps a leased Roll-on/Roll-off merchant ship, can carry a quantity of relief and construction supplies equivalent to hundreds of flights of C-17 transport aircraft and can then remain on station in the disaster area for extended periods as a mobile headquarters, floating hospital, or a Rest & Recreation site for exhausted relief workers - to name only a few potential roles.
Unfortunately the current 40-year old AORs are not in good-enough material condition that they can be readily available at short notice for such tasking. This was the case in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina devastated the US Gulf Coast and a Canadian Coast Guard vessel deployed with her bulk-cargo capacity together with a Halifax-based naval task group. The only East Coast AOR at the time, HMCS Preserver, was just emerging from a major refit and not available for operations. Modern vessels with the capacity to carry bulk cargo or act as mobile bases, such as the planned Joint Support Ships, are a true national resource in time of conflict or disaster.
Initial post on Jan 28 2010 | 2 comments | Last comment on Feb 03 2010
Monday, Jan 25 2010
Piracy
A strong voice demands change in anti-piracy operations
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
The Hong Kong Shipowners’ Association (HKSOA) has released what is described as “a furious statement” condemning the current organizational construct and tactical practices employed by naval forces to prevent piratical activities off the Horn of Africa. They accuse the international community of “tolerating piracy instead of eliminating attacks” and “sending out the message that piracy carries little risk for generous reward.” The HKSOA has demanded “a more robust approach from the international community.”
One analyst, from Tactical Defence Concepts (Maritime), reports “This is a stance that will resonate across the shipping industry that is becoming increasingly frustrated with pirates who seem able to operate with impunity. Military patrols in the Gulf of Aden have prevented many attacks but the pirates have simply moved far out to sea.” Patrols, vice escort, seems to be the basis of their objection to the current plans.
The advent of ‘group transit’ tactics (convoying by any other name) by some of the naval contingents in the region is a very welcome development. Cdr. Trim’s post reports that they are being undertaken by “nations like China, India, and Japan.” Not being members of the various naval coalitions operating under the task force construct likely compels these nations to accept one of the only tasks open to them. There has always been a resistance to escort operations, vice independent patrols, amongst navies.
Convoying has always been viewed as a lower order of naval work than patrolling. Canadian author Ken Macpherson characterized accurately the general perception of convoy work before the Second World War among professional destroyermen in the Canadian navy: “The 1939-45 war was to change [Canadian plans for offensive ‘hunting’ patrols by groups of destroyers against enemy surface raiders] and see most of them, like thoroughbreds in harness, cast in the plodding role of watchdog to trade convoys.” (Macpherson, The River Class Destroyers, p.15). There has never been (to this point) an effective alternative to group transit when the enemy holds so many operational and tactical advantages as they do now. The escort system must extend to the limits of the danger area, so far as it is known. In this case, it is somewhat limited. In other cases, it has been much more extensive.
The idea of navies engaging in a global system of trade protection has repeatedly been rejected by naval leaders. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond felt strongly that there was just such a requirement. But, he had already been declared something of a heretic for his unconventional views on the size and missions for capital ships during the inter-war period and he was dismissed summarily when, quoting President Franklin Roosevelt, Richmond advocated for “a navy not only to protect our shores and our possessions, but our merchant ships in time of war, no matter where they go” (Richmond, Seapower in the Modern World, pp, 56, 223. Emphasis in original text).
There were many areas of the world’s oceans where convoying was not instituted during the last war. One such was the west coast of Canada where the threat was viewed an on-going low level menace from Japanese submarines with the potential for a sporadic medium-level problem due to a Japanese surge operation. The director of plans, Captain (later Vice Admiral) Harry DeWolf, conducted a staff estimate to assess the threat and examine possible courses of action. Not surprisingly, DeWolf recommended that convoying not be instituted, that air and surface local patrols be mounted only in the focal areas near ports and straits, and that evasive routing and air patrols in more distant areas were enough to provide a “reasonable degree of protection.” The danger to shipping was perceived to be too slight to merit institution of a system that would reduce the carrying capacity of shipping by 35 percent and instigate a plethora of other logistical problems. The decision to convoy is a very difficult one and is not to be undertaken lightly, whether dealing with a conventional military threat or something else.
The question now devolves to a question of the perception of threat and the actual risk involved. The perception of the Hong Kong Shipoweners’ Association appears to be quite different from that of the planners responsible for organizing the anti-piracy operation. If the analyst from TDC Maritime is correct, and this perception “resonates across the shipping industry,” there will likely be some naval planners digging into the history books as they look for other options.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 13 comments | Last comment on Feb 02 2010
Monday, Jan 18 2010
Piracy
Background and Update on NATO Counter Piracy Operations off Somalia
Commander Larry Trim, CF.
I have read all the posts about piracy and find them very interesting…but somewhat misinformed in certain areas. I am also somewhat disappointed that there is an absence of information about NATO’s contribution to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. I am presently the second in command of the N3 (naval operations) department within the Maritime Component Commander Northwood, United Kingdom. I have been in this position for six months, and throughout this time have only worked the piracy issue. I offer the following information with respect to NATO Counter Piracy Operations off the coast of Somalia.
NATOs first deployment to the region was early 2009, when NATO was deploying to Australia to conduct an out of area deployment. However, due to the exponential rise in piracy the ships were diverted and began operations in the Gulf of Aden to combat the pirates. The initial operation was called Operation Allied Protector, which has since morphed into Operation Ocean Shield (which was approved by the North Atlantic Council August 2009). Since this time, ships from SNMG1 and SNMG2 have been rotating into the Gulf of Aden every four months, and will continue to do so into the indefinite future. Now to address some of the piracy posts on Broadsides.
First the UNSCRs that deals with Somalia. UNSR 1897 is a merging of authorizations given in UNSCR 1846 and 1851. In practical terms the most important aspects of the UNSCRs is that it allows naval forces to enter the Territorial Waters (TTW) of Somalia. This means that the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia is giving up a portion of its sovereignty to allow the international community to police its waters. Why is this important for NATO? One of the posts here mentions the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor. This eastbound/westbound highway on the seas stretches about 550 nautical miles. Within this corridor, naval units from NATO, European Naval Force, and Coalition Maritime Force station there units to allow for the safe transit of the many merchant vessels that transit the corridor each day. To the south of the corridor, along the coast of Somalia in a region called Puntland, where the pirates originate from. As mentioned above, with the ability to enter the TTWs of Somalia, the naval forces are preventing the pirates from departing their strongholds. Combine this ability with patrolling the corridor, Maritime Patrol Aircraft flying over the area, and the actions of the Puntland authorities, we have seen a significant reduction of pirated attacks within the GOA. Until the recent hijacks of the two vessels end Dec 09 and early Jan 10, there were no successful hijacks in over four months in the Gulf of Aden. If you compare this to only one year ago, this is a significant achievement.
Second, one post mentions the arming of merchant vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. One would think that this would be an acceptable solution to piracy. I totally agree with this assessment. However, the merchant community and owners feel differently. When a CEO of a shipping company was visiting our headquarters to provide his experience with the ransom process I asked him that question. His response was that this would raise the level of violence between the merchant crews and pirates. Additionally, the cost of hiring firms that could effectively conduct this business model was considered prohibitive. Combine this with flag state issues, flag states of convenience, entering countries with armed teams onboard and you can see how complicated this issue becomes. For the most part, the shipping owners and companies don’t want to start arming their crews to combat pirates. Without armed teams onboard, the only way to defeat the pirates is by following Best Management Practices (BMP). Uk Hydrographic chart Q6099 explains the BMPs in detail if you are interested. So, why are ships still being pirated? Well, you would think that all owners and merchant captains would take these Best Management Practices to heart and employ them with vigor. About 80 percent of the ships are following these BMPs…but there is another 20 percent that are not. There are still vessels that are pirated within the 80 percent, but for the most part it is those vessels that are not taking any precautions to stop the pirates. Of course it is a combination of following BMPs, alerting naval forces of attacks, and how fast the warships can respond. In the Gulf of Aden, warships are stationed to respond within 15 minutes of an attack. The window is between 15-30 minutes to arrive on scene to stop a pirate attack with helo or warship. This has been accomplished on many occasions over the past few months.
Another post mentions that there will be significant risk to naval boarding teams due to the arming of merchant vessels, miscommunication due to language, poor weapon handling etc. This position is inaccurate due to the fact that the naval vessels in the region are not visiting these merchant vessels. The merchant traffic is the ones that need protecting. So why would we visit? The naval boarding teams are spending their entire time finding and boarding small vessels used for piracy, and DHOWS that are often used as mother ships. There have been many inspections suspected and actual pirate vessels. Often as the warship approaches ladders and weapons are thrown overboard. Many weapons, cell phones and GPS have been confiscated, and useful intelligence has been gathered. Of course, these inspections lead one to ask the question about the “Catch and Release Policy” that NATO exercises. I will address this in the next section.
Many of the posts mention the problems with legal arrangements and inadequate Rules of Engagement (ROE). It is no secret that NATO doesn’t have legal arrangements in the area, to allow NATO ships to embark detainees and deliver them for justice at the local magistrate. On a more careful inspection of this topic, one must ask “is it really a limiting factor” that will cause the failure of NATOs mission? Based on the success that NATO has had in the Gulf of Aden I would suggest no! More to the point, what overall impact will it really have to prosecute and jail a 20 year old Somali youth that is only trying to improve his lot in live? Wouldn’t it make more sense to actively seek out those that plan, finance, and provide logistics for pirate operations? Additionally, those organizations and countries that have entered into arrangements with Kenya and Seychelles quickly understand that the devil is in the details. Those that are detained and brought before a judge in Kenya must do so within a limited timeframe. This become very problematic when you detain in the Gulf of Aden and must transport to Kenya. This long transit significantly impacts the ability of that warship to patrol in the IRTC, and conduct other operations to stop acts of piracy. Also, the limited number of prosecutors and judges means that cases are often not heard for months. In fact we have a post commanding officer that travels to Kenya on a regular basis to participate in the court process…months and months after the actual detainment and handing over to Kenyan officials. So, suffice to say that having legal arrangements to detain and prosecute is not the panacea that many of the posts mention. I would postulate that many of the organizations that are presently taking detainees will stop this process due to the problems mentioned above. Finally, the subject of ROE. I won’t go into the details due to security concerns but suffice to say that NATO has robust and excellent ROE. The mission has seen great successes over the past five months in the Gulf of Aden and contrary to a few posts NATO ROE in no way hampers or restricts the commander’s ability to conduct his mission.
A few posts mention that the IRTC is not an appropriate method to ensure the safety of the merchant traffic in the area. In fact, there are many convoys or group transits that take place every day. Nations like Russia, China, India, and Japan are conducting these types of operations daily. Those that are not part of the group transits can proceed via the IRTC and combined with their Best Management Practices is a very safe method to transit the Gulf of Aden. A more difficulty problem is the Somali Basin. The majority of the successful pirate attacks have taken place in this massive area of sea. One can easily place the entire eastern seaboard of the United States in this area as a comparison of its size. The pirates that operate in this area are very different from those that ply the waters of the Gulf of Aden. They operate in open boats out to a range in excess of 900 nautical miles, for weeks at a time. Combine this tactic with those merchant vessels not registering with naval authorities (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization in Dubai, NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, or Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa in EUNAVFORCE in Northwood) to allow them to receive information about pirate areas of concern in the Somali Basin, and not practicing Best Management Practices and you can see why there has been a significant rise in vessels pirated in this larger area.
Finally, I would like to close this post with some information about SHADE. This stands for Shared Awareness and Deconfliction. This is a group of likeminded organizations and countries that are committed to ending piracy off the coast of Somalia. This group meets in Bahrain monthly and ensures that there is continued success in the IRTC. NATO, EU, CMF and countries such as China, Russia, Japan, and India meet at the tactical level and work together. As a Canadian Naval Officer working for NATO I often have lunch with Russian and Chinese officers to discuss how to improve the situation in the Gulf of Aden. I would suggest that the recent agreement by China to become more actively engaged in the IRTC is historic.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 13 comments | Last comment on Feb 02 2010
Monday, Jan 11 2010
Should the Navy return to the Arctic?
A view from the army.
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
Major J. Sheahan, Nancy Teeple and Peter Gizewski have produced a futuristic view of Arctic Security in an article entitled, “Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Under Siege: The Prince Patrick Incident of 2040—An Alternative Security Future.” The article was published in Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 12.2 (Summer 2009), pp. 37-49. You can read the article here.
My thanks to Senior Research Fellow Peter Haydon for bringing this article to my attention.
Initial post on May 23 2007 | 4 comments | Last comment on Jan 13 2010
Thursday, Jan 07 2010
Piracy
The weakness of Defended Lanes exposed by an ‘audacious pirate attack’
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
In my post on 7 December, entitled “Whether to Protect the Sea or Protect the Ships,” I argued that efforts to create defended lanes are a “misguided effort at sea control” and that history has shown repeatedly that they are based on a flawed operational concept. I did not realize at that time that it would take only one month for the Somali pirates to expose this fact.
World Sentinel reports that the British-flagged chemical tanker St. James Park had left southern Spain, bound for Thailand, and was hijacked on New Year’s Day in the International Recommended Transit Corridor, a ‘patrol zone’ through the Gulf of Aden. The corridor is promulgated by the USN Liaison Office (MARLO) in Bahrain. You can find more information on the corridor here. You can read the International Maritime Bureau “Live Piracy Report” and see a map depicting the location of the attack here.
The report in World Sentinel makes it clear that there was no escort for St. James Park because, in the words of Commander John Harper, spokesman for the EU's anti-piracy flotilla, “St James Park opted to act independently and unfortunately there was no naval ship close enough to offer assistance in time.” The object of a defended lane tactic is to provide sufficient presence in a specific area so that the level of force deters the aggressor from acting against the transiting ships. There are two problems with this plan.
First – the Somali pirates are not at all deterred by presence of the naval anti-piracy force, nor are they concerned with their potential actions even if they should happen to be present. The ‘catch-and-release’ policy means that even uneducated Somali pirates can figure out the risk-reward equation.
Second – the anti-piracy naval forces can never be reactive enough when in such close proximity to land. The pirates use high-speed and very manoeuvrable small craft for these dash-and-grab raids. In such circumstances, the naval vessel must be in the immediate vicinity of the target ship in order to be sufficiently reactive.
In case the conceptual point of distinction here is lost, I will spell it out clearly: a naval vessel that is compelled to be in close proximity to a merchant vessel that requires protection is NOT ON PATROL. This arrangement is known as CLOSE ESCORT and it is used in the protection of trade for a tactical system known as CONVOYING. By definition, a convoy can consist of as little as one vessel under naval direction. The degree of protection provided can range from simple routing instructions, to distant escort, and down to close escort. The degree of the protection provided depends on the level of threat and the ability of the assigned forces to counter that threat.
In my earlier post, I cited the commander of the EU Naval Counter Piracy Force, Rear-Admiral Peter Hudson, who said: “The EU Naval Force’s strategy [sic: it is actually an Operating Concept] in the smaller Gulf of Aden is to lengthen the amount of time it takes pirates to get on board so that a warship or helicopter can be dispatched to the scene.” This statement means that the naval forces are relying on a concept of ‘directed dispersion’ to place ships in the correct patrol locations (more likely patrol boxes) necessary to intercept pirate craft before they can seize a merchant ship. They are attempting to use their limited number of escorts in an intelligent fashion to achieve the maximum benefit. They have narrowed down the area of the sea they wish to ‘control’ to the smallest amount possible by declaring the International Recommended Transit Corridor and focussing their patrols in this area, hoping for the maximum return on the investment of time, resources and energy. Nevertheless, they are still engaged in patrolling, not escorting.
The losses will continue so long as the pirates hold the advantages of numbers, initiative, speed, reaction and manoeuvre over the naval anti-piracy forces. Only once the naval force resorts to the concept of ‘concentration’ for local effectiveness will the situation change. The warships and aircraft cannot be everywhere at all times. In fact, they cannot even be most places for most of the time. The key concept must become that they only need to be where the shipping is sailing and only at the times they are needed. (This may need to be narrowed down further to where the most important shipping is through a critical vulnerability analysis.) The only way to do this effectively is to concentrate the shipping and provide an adequate level of escort. Patrolling areas of ocean that are empty of both merchant ships and pirate craft is a complete waste of time. This has always been the case in the past and it is the case again now.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 13 comments | Last comment on Feb 02 2010
Monday, Jan 04 2010
Should the Navy return to the Arctic?
Canada’s Place among the Sea Front Nations.
Col. (Ret'd) Brian K. Wentzell, CFPS Research Fellow
Ken Hansen has posed an interesting question. It is not a question that is independent of other maritime concerns, namely "maritime blindness of the Canadian society", the future of the Canadian navy, and the national interests of Canada. Irrespective of the scientific reasons for the climatic changes unfolding in the Arctic, no one can reasonably deny that significant changes are occurring throughout the entire region and these changes directly affect Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States of America (the Sea Front Nations). These are the nation states with sea frontages on the Arctic Ocean.
There are many other nations with actual or potential commercial and other interests in the Arctic region. As the sea ice melts and the climate moderates, scientific research, commercial and non-commercial ship traffic, mineral and petroleum exploration and exploitation, fishing, and tourism will all increase and bring with them the need for the Sea Front Nations to regulate the wide variety of human activities, individually and collectively. In a federal state, such as Canada, this involves the federal government, several provinces and the three territories. There are therefore a multitude of governmental interests and agencies that have specific responsibilities over aspects of human endeavour.
The Canadian Forces, through its Joint Task Force North, interacts with a variety of federal, provincial, territorial and private sector entities, departments and agencies. Some matters relate to specific defence concerns while others are in aid of the civil power. All affect matters of national interest and involve national values. It is within this broad context that the Canadian Forces (and the Canadian navy) obtains its tasks and authority to carry out its functions. The Canada First Defence Strategy lists the national defence priorities as: (1) the defence of Canada, (2) the defence of North America, and (3) collective defence through international organisations, alliances and coalitions. Clearly, the defence of Canadian sovereign territory, air space and sea space is the primary task of the Canadian Forces and the navy. It is up to the political, military and naval leadership of Canada to meet this requirement responsibly and in a timely fashion.
The question is not, "Should the Navy Return to the Arctic?" but rather "How will the Canadian Forces, including the navy, execute its assigned tasks?" From a maritime perspective there are political and diplomatic issues to be resolved that will shape the nature of the military and naval response. Much will be decided in bilateral country level negotiations, through application of the provisions of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, and the development on national, provincial and territorial laws. The military and naval response ideally will take the form of surveillance of the Canadian sovereign or managed air, land and sea spaces, the identification and investigation of potential intrusions, and the provision of counter penetration forces, as and when required. In addition there will be search and rescue activities, aid to civil authorities such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Services, the federal Department of the Environment, and provincial/territorial governments. These will be akin to constabulary type duties.
The navy will require command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, armed response, scientific and logistic resources that are available on a persistent basis. Due to distance from the command facilities, bases and support organizations in southern Canada, the capabilities and skills acquired from the expeditionary activities dating from the Korean Conflict through today in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Afghanistan will have some relevance. For the navy this means that it must contribute to the whole of government approach by managing defence tasks on, over and under the Arctic Ocean. This does not appear to require an ice capable anti-air warfare destroyer but it does require an ice capable patrol vessel that has sufficient size and endurance to persistently contribute to the command, control, communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, scientific and armed response tasks. The Danes and Norwegians have developed their naval solutions which can be used as a baseline. The United States is thinking about its response; however, their only real naval response today is the nuclear powered attack and missile equipped submarines. The Russians have heavy icebreakers and nuclear powered ballistic missile and attack submarines in their fleet as well as scientific vessels. The Canadian navy needs a general purpose vessel that can conduct a wide variety of tasks within the context of space based surveillance systems, airborne surveillance and response resources, ground based air and coastal radars, electronic and communications intelligence gathering capabilities, as well as sea bottom sensors.
There is a job for the Canadian Forces and the navy up north. Is the leadership of the federal government, the Canadian Forces and the navy up to the challenge? Are Canadians so ambivalent about the north of our country that we are prepared to accede effective control of it to the other Sea Front Nations? As a taxpayer, I say it is time for Canadians, including its political, diplomatic, and military leaders to rise and meet the challenge. If that requires the navy to trade activities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for the Arctic Ocean, so be it. If that requires the army to curtail its expeditionary activities to provide resources for the defence of Canada, do it. While Canada ponders and debates, our international friends and competitors move forward.
Initial post on May 23 2007 | 4 comments | Last comment on Jan 13 2010
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