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The Online Discussion Forum
of the Canadian Naval Review
We have created this Discussion Forum to encourage timely and informed discussion of current issues of interest to those in the Canadian and international defence and maritime security community. We believe strongly that this concept of a maritime-oriented policy forum is in keeping with the educational and public outreach mandate of the Canadian Naval Review.
Announcing New Publications from the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies:
Breaking the Box: The Increasing Demands of Non-Combat Roles on Maritime Forces
Edited by Kenneth P. Hansen
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Breaking the Box: The increasing demands of non-combat roles on maritime forces, edited by Kenneth P. Hansen, is a compilation of twelve selected papers from the Maritime Security Conferences held at Dalhousie in 2007 and 2008. Contributors include: Senator Colin Kenny, Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Rear-Admiral Paul Maddison, Dr. Martin N. Murphy, Dr. Stan Weeks and Commander Varadarajan Srivatsan. The papers provide insights into whether or not the demands of the new security environment necessitate a re-balancing of naval and coast guard roles and capabilities. |
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US Nuclear Strategy and the Implications for Global Security
Edited by David S. McDonough
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This edited volume brings together the proceedings of a policy workshop in which Canadian and American strategic thinkers and arms control experts discussed recent US nuclear weapon developments. Difference facets of US nuclear strategy are examined, touching on such diverse issues as counter-proliferation doctrine, missile defence systems, NATO nuclear weapon policies, strategic nuclear stability, American grand strategy and Canada-US relations. What is the current status of US nuclear strategy and deterrence? What are the implications of current US nuclear developments to global security? What are Canadian strategic interests and what impact will these developments have on Canada's international security policy? The chapters in this volume seek to answer these and other salient questions. |
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New Issues in Security #3
State-Society Relations in Uganda: The Search for Security, Development and State Legitimacy
By Jordan Guthrie
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This monograph approaches conflict in northern Uganda within its broader historical context, shedding light on important dynamics of state-society relations and avenues for improving contemporary approaches to conflict resolution and development in Uganda and other post-colonial states. By examining colonial state formation in Uganda, this analysis locates the sources of contemporary conflict in the deeply entrenched problems stemming from historical deficits of state legitimacy and the concomitant realities facing leaders of weak states. By 'bringing the state back' into the analysis of conflict in Uganda, important insights are gained into current debates on security, neo-liberal reforms, governance and sustainable development in Africa. |
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Announcement:
The Call for Papers for the sixth biennial RAN Sea Power Conference has been issued. The conference will be held at the Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre 27-29 January 2010. The theme of the conference is "Combined and Joint Operations from the Sea."
Announcement:
A Companion Discussion Forum to Broadsides is launched by the Air Force.
The Canadian Forces Air Warfare Centre is in the process of establishing a 'blog'. This website will deal with a wide array of aerospace power issues.
The following guidelines for submissions have been promulgated by their moderator:
"The Aerospace Warfare Centre Blog welcomes the submission of articles, book reviews and comments that cover the scope of Air Force doctrine, training, leadership, lessons learned and Air Force operations: past, present or future. Submissions on related subjects such as ethics, future technology and Air Force history are also accepted. For Blog articles we prefer that they are written in academic style and agree to the principles of Creative Commons copyrights. All submissions will be reviewed and the moderator will notify contributors on the status of their submissions. All articles and commentaries are welcome."
The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies welcomes the arrival of the Aerospace Warfare Centre Blog and wishes them great success with their venture.
Ken Hansen Forum Moderator
Announcement:
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) of the United States has released its report - "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World." This is their 4th unclassified report that gives a long-term view of the future.
- Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
- Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project
- Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Non-government Experts
- Global Trends 2010
Thursday, Nov 19 2009
Piracy
EU Anti-piracy Naval Force Warship Tracks Down Pirate Mother Ship
Ken Hansen, CFPS Defence Fellow
The European Union scored a major success on Thursday, 12 November, when the French warship Floreal tracked down and apprehended the pirate attack group responsible for the recently reported attacks against the large tanker BW Lion, 500 miles northwest of the Seychelles. This was reported as the furthest any vessel had been attacked from the Somali coast by pirates. You can read more about the event here.
The operation entailed the use of intelligence to cue search assets, the use of a long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and a high-endurance, patrol-type warship. Hunting for small ships in an area that is over 350,000 square nautical miles is proving to be a cost-intensive operation.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 8 comments | Last comment on Nov 19 2009
Wednesday, Nov 18 2009
Piracy
Countering Somali Piracy – All International Eggs in one Basket?
(Reprinted from “Seaways,” Journal of the Nautical Institute, September 2009, pp. 30-31.)
David Mugride, CFPS Research Fellow
The focused intervention of foreign naval forces off the coast of Somalia raises as many questions as it answers. Why Somalia and not Nigeria or Indonesia? Why so much emphasis on treating it as a simple maritime issue rather than looking at its root causes? Why has international law proved so ineffective in dealing with piracy? This article will examine the issue and context of Somali Piracy as well as offer some advice on self protection measures for merchant ships. The International Institute for Strategic Studies recently produced an informative and readable fact sheet on the issue of Somali Piracy. Its author makes some direct and apposite observations over both the threat to the merchant community and the nature of the international response. This work is highly recommended and would be of value to those working in corporate offices within the maritime industry and to those in command at sea as a short digest of the issue.
Piracy in one form or another has existed for centuries but why has Somali piracy captured such international attention, when incidences of piracy in Nigeria or Indonesia fail the headline test? To my mind, this is because Somalia has provided the global media with a very newsworthy series of stories in which dramatic images of captured merchant ships and their crews can be played out in front of an increasingly “sea-blind” home audience. They have managed to deliver news spectaculars in which super-tankers, vessels carrying tanks or weapons have been held hostage and critically individual personal stories in which Western hostages have been freed in daring special forces’ missions. All of these are manna from heaven for a western news media hungry for stories which offer a new angle on the desperate nature of life in the failed state of Somalia.
There is no doubt civilian sea-farers can do more to help themselves when transiting areas of risk. Arming seafarers is a common cry but are ship owners and crewing agencies going to pay the training bill to keep weapon handling and tactical skills are an appropriate level? The answer is probably not but collective / corporate responses like transit convoys, registering with regional naval forces, embarking military personnel / private security companies, implementing self protection measures such as vessel lock-downs and extra on-watch crew all make their ships less attractive and harder to assault than those who do not implement these relatively easy counter-measures.
A review of Op Atalanta, the EUNAVFOR (European Union Naval Force) mission shows a highly evolved and focused naval mission which in conjunction with the activities of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and those of other interested countries has become one of the largest international military activities seen outside of combat operations in recent years. But is this surge of military activity the right course of action or is it sustainable? How many of the countries currently involved will still be able to send ships and personnel in a year or even in a decade? History has taught us that such military adventures are the thin edge of a longer term and enduring wedge. The Royal Navy’s decision to gap its on-station warship in the Falkland Islands in preference to its contribution to counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa is reflective of its need to retain command of the deployed EUNAVFOR for political reasons but also illustrates a failure to balance its commitments and resources. After-all the argument must go “no contribution, no task-force command” and the Royal Navy needs this deployed command so it can justify its current command structure to an over-stretched, battle weary Army or an overly ambitious, maritime sceptic Royal Air Force?
While talk of surge activity is common in the fight against insurgents or terrorists, such activity seems incongruous in the maritime context. Unlike the comprehensive military campaigns being waged in Iraq or Afghanistan there seems to be little activity, apart from guaranteeing the security of food aid convoys, which is looking to address the break-down of Somali society or the very reasons why piracy developed in the Horn of Africa. If the excellent work of Generals Patraeus and Mattis can be adapted for this maritime campaign then perhaps the recent lessons learnt on their turf could be applied in the maritime surf. Piracy is only in part a maritime issue because its root causes are political, economic and social. Failure to address these is a sure-fire guarantee of this becoming an enduring issue.
Questions over the viability or value of certain countries military responses have been raised across the globe. Naval vessels deployed to the region without robust Rules of Engagement or the capability to deter incidents of Piracy are very much paper tigers, whose contribution is purely political. HMCS Winnipeg’s recent deployment saw the Canadian public opinion question the value of sending such a capable unit for an extended deployment with only the ability to detain, to disarm and to release persons suspected of piracy. The British government’s much heralded bilateral agreement with Kenya, which allows for suspects to be tried in Kenyan courts, just illustrates the failure of today’s international law in dealing with this increasingly violent problem.
The value of delivering a regional solution rather than imposing one from outside cannot be overstated. Up until now for the want of equipment, expertise and resources neighbouring states have been unable to contribute more effectively in the battle against the pirates. There are pleasing examples of where Western nations are now building local capacity to redress years of political under-investment in the region but these will all take time. Yet it is hoped that just as a capable Iraqi Navy now patrols its own territorial waters under the guidance of the coalition Task Group, so in years to come the likes of Yemen, Kenyan, Djibouti and Somalia will be able to deter piracy in their own waters and protect the 20% of global trade that passes through the Bab El Mendeb Straits. Here the excellent work undertaken by the Royal Navy, amongst others, in Iraq and Nigeria can be used to great effect. There we saw training teams deployed into theatre to deliver the capacity building required delivering viable water-borne law enforcement, but if this job is to be done then unlike Iraq it must be resourced appropriately so that full local technical co-operation and participation can be achieved.
At the moment Flag Officer Sea training in Plymouth is providing its usual brand of focused and realistic training for NATO navies deploying East of Suez. Its combination of Task Group and individual platform training is complemented by mobile, deployable teams who add polish to units on their transit to operations. This work is essential if those asked to discharge dangerous military missions are to be fully prepared for what challenges lie ahead. Yet in this resource driven world, we must hope that the work of such organisations is not viewed by those who only know its financial cost and not its long term value.
Countering piracy is one of the clearest examples of how many navies are responding to today’s security challenges with both Cold War doctrine and equipment. Despite nearly a generation passing more appropriate equipment and platforms is still a long way off. Perhaps only the USN is able to field modern bespoke ships which are custom built for this sort of task. Yet although the train of progress is slow there are clear examples of countries that recognise the value of constabulary maritime activity to their national security. The recent Australian Defence White Paper does exactly that, unequivocally showing Australia’s resolve to procure and deploy a strong, capable Navy to provide defence in depth of its national interests.
Legal problems and seemingly inappropriate rules of engagement have done much to hamstring an effective response to either piracy or maritime based terrorism. There is a plethora of international law which should deal with these issues but in the case of Somalia we see almost a “back to the drawing board” stance being taken by military lawyers who scramble between establishing hasty bilateral agreements with neighbouring states and compromising a commander’s ability to conduct their mission with heavily caveated rules of engagement. From an outsider’s perspective the lack of prosecutions under existing international agreements like ISPS or SUA suggests they are not being used at this time of greatest need because they are not up to the mark.
In conclusion, Somali piracy is not an easy problem to solve but with collective military, legal and commercial collaboration it is highly likely that it can be managed effectively. Measured and sustainable military activity which addresses regional shortfalls is required in the short-term until a viable and resourced regional solution can be established. The international community is guilty on focusing upon this one region as a cause celebre and as a consequence it has forgotten that piracy is a widespread issue. All hotbeds of piracy require international collaboration and action unless we are to sacrifice the safety and welfare of seafarers as they go about their professional lives where-ever that may be. The lessons being identified off Somalia need to be learnt and then applied where-ever piracy occurs.
Initial post on Dec 11 2008 | 8 comments | Last comment on Nov 19 2009
Thursday, Nov 12 2009
The Future of the Navy
An ‘Alternative Canadian Navy’ of 2030
Dave Mugridge
Many pundits were surprised by the extent of the overdue 2013 National Defence Review’s re-positioning of Canada’s traditional defence assumptions and, in particular, its revitalisation of the navy. Afghanistan and Somali had both provided belated impetuses for a doctrinal shift away from conventional Cold War thinking towards that required for today’s irregular security challenges. The review also placed a renewed focus on expeditionary operations. All of this followed the delayed, inconclusive withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Afghan combat operations and HMCS Ville de Quebec’s mauling off Somalia.
For a generation after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Canada, like most of NATO, had enjoyed a peace dividend, the ability to divert fiscal funding away from defence into schools and hospitals. It created a vibrant and healthy social economy. Fiscal storm clouds remained on the horizon until 2008, when the global economy didn’t just falter; it collapsed into a five-year slump. Those dark days heralded the irreversible rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China and the gradual decline of both the American and European economic power-bases. The continued rise of non-state terrorism and it’s nexus with organised crime ensured that the world became a less secure place as it struggled to deal with global warming and mass famine.
Afghanistan was lost politically somewhere in the corridors of power during 2011. The mired battle-field of Kandahar saw the ignominious withdrawal of Canada’s last combat troops a year later. The real impact of earlier decisions by Canada not to back the MacCrystal plan to wage a fully fledged counter insurgency campaign against the Taliban were realised when it became apparent that an unpopular political settlement with the Taliban was required if peace was to ever be restored, now that victory in the conventional sense was impossible.
The crippling of Ville de Quebec, off Mogadishu in 2012, heralded a wave of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against western maritime interests. The realisation that a conventional naval response could no longer contain international maritime terrorism and organised crime forced the issue upon politicians and senior military officers alike. By 2013 the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ was sufficiently discredited to allow the Canadian disciples of American Generals Mattis and Patraeus to come to the fore. It was under these circumstances that a radical defence review was announced.
The review embraced the findings of earlier works from the United States and Australia. Within its pages were the seeds of today’s leaner, capability-based Canadian military and its focus on delivering significantly improved joint expeditionary military effects. At the time, the decision to increase the navy’s share of the defence budget to 2o percent was met with surprise by our sea-blind populous. Today’s robust navy and the healthy national ship-building programme are testimony to a far-sighted decision to acknowledge Canada’s maritime dependence and deliver a comprehensive approach to maritime security.
The purchase of four Landing Ships Dock (LSDs), that were built to a Canadian commercial design, created the strategic lift it needed to support the army’s amphibious, expeditionary focus, and complemented the air forces’ equally brave decision to concentrate its assets in air transport and support helicopters. Within ten years, an army battle-group with full combat support and helicopter lift could be deployed from the sea; a move that catapulted Canada into the premier division of amphibious operations and, at a stroke, saved the Canadian ship-building industry for a generation.
These LSD ships are also able to accept containerised stores or munitions as well as a specially constructed deployable command and control suite for the embarked military force. The flight deck and hangar facilities are capable of landing and supporting Chinook (CH-47) helicopters and Osprey (V-22) tilt-wing aircraft. The Canadian LSDs are the envy of many other navies, who regret their own lack of foresight to build-in space for capability developments. During recent years the occasional presence of one of these ships as a national contribution to Medecins Sans Frontieres has shown the Canadian people the versatility of large naval ships in deployed humanitarian operations.
The once contested Joint Support Ships (JSS) have proved to be an exceptional investment. They have served Canadian defence interests for nearly two decades, recently emerging from a mid-life upgrade that saw the fitting of landing craft davits and emergency transit accommodations. When employed at the heart of an Amphibious Ready Group, the embarked staffs enjoy the latest in communications and domain awareness equipment for directing littoral operations. They have vindicated the decision to build three hulls as one of them has been forward based East of Suez in rotation for the last five years, as the cornerstone of the African Union’s stabilisation operation in Somalia. They also support the deployed Small Water Plane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) craft. Canada has led the world in providing deployed naval engineering capabilities with these ships; across the full spectrum of military operations, they provide high readiness engineering support from deployable naval teams from the dockyards and the naval engineering battalion.
The new air independent propulsion submarines, procured as a joint venture with Australia, have already been employed operationally. Their third generation cruise missiles were used as part of recent NATO operations to counter illegal Colombian narcotics operations in West Africa. The missiles destroyed forward operating bases (landing strips, port distribution facilities) of the Medellin drug cartels with surgical precision. The operation was only undertaken when it became apparent that corrupt local enforcement agencies were in the pay of the drug barons, yet something still needed to be done by the international community to stem the clear and present danger of mass narcotic distribution. Four of the class of eight have been optimised for under ice operations and provide a significant surveillance capability for monitoring Russian naval activity in the disputed waters of the Arctic. But it was the venerable HMCS Cornerbrook’s rescue of a stranded USN SEAL team off Yemen some 15 years ago that brought the Canadian submarine service to the world’s attention. In a faultless Special Operations extraction she undoubtedly saved the lives of those allied service personnel and denied Al Qaeda a media coup of being able to parade them in front of local TV.
The surface ship fleet looks very different to what was envisaged in 2009. Instead of the 15 surface combatants talked about, the fleet numbers just 10 high-end frigates. These are fully equipped general purpose warships which represent the very latest in technology and automation. With the latest in anti-ballistic missile technology they routinely join their USN colleagues as part of North American Aerospace Defence Command’s (NORAD’s) defensive posture for protecting the homeland from rogue nuclear states. They weigh in at 7,000 tonnes but are crewed by just 120; their modular weaponry means they are optimised for each mission but can role change in approximately 36 hours if berthed alongside a JSS. These work horses reflect the best of Canadian industry and the export versions are in service with six other nations. Their cutting edge technology and environmentally conscious design has earned valuable export orders for a wide spectrum of home grown firms that range from gas turbine engine maintenance in Prince Edward Island to surveillance equipment in Newfoundland.
In a direct savings transfer from the then future Canadian Surface Combatant, DND was able to procure 8 gun-armed, helicopter / Unmanned Airborne Vehicle (UAV) capable “Sea-Fighter” Fast Sea Frames (FSF-1) from L-3. These ships are nearly permanently deployed or forward based, operating on a 42-day cycle. Their joint naval reserve and police crew of 26 swap in and out of the operating theatres. A mission-simulating Continuous Professional Development training program prepares each new crew before deployment. Typically five of these Sea Fighter ships are deployed away from Canada on counter piracy or counter narcotics operations. Their employment in law enforcement roles has allowed optimisation of employment and training for the frigate and off-shore patrol ships (AOPS) squadrons. The Sea Fighters have also eradicated problems of manpower dislocation by being crewed from the Reserve Divisions. The capacity and military effect they have delivered has surpassed expectations and revolutionised the deployment strategy of the Canadian navy.
The AOPS squadrons have continued to operate from all three naval bases and, in concert with their Coast Guard colleagues, provide year round surveillance of the Arctic. This presence has done much to validate Canadian claims of territorial sovereignty and dissuade other nations from making false claims against this inhospitable but geologically rich region. Their logistical and medical capacities have been crucial to developing links with the aboriginal peoples of the North and have helped to protect a unique way of life. The ships have also provided a higher degree of environmental protection to this disputed region. These vessels’ crews are supplemented by aboriginal personnel from two new Naval Reserve divisions established in the Arctic. Like their British patrol ship counterparts, they have also been used to represent a softer face of the Canadian military through their deployment on capacity building and humanitarian assistance missions outside the Polar Regions.
From the unfortunate events of two decades ago was born a navy that has embraced technology and innovative manning structures to deliver considerable military effect across the full spectrum of conflict. Its commitment to joint operations has been proven time and time again, demonstrating the inherent flexibility of naval forces in today’s unconventional security environment. It is far to say the navy has led the way in joint operations but the laudable commitment of the other armed forces and agencies such as the police and border service has meant Canada now leads the world in possessing a comprehensive pan government maritime security strategy. The Canadian navy is truly 3-D – A formidable Deterrent, a facet of national Diplomacy, and a versatile tool to Develop the abilities of those nations in need.
Initial post on Nov 10 2009 | 1 comment | Last comment on Nov 16 2009
Friday, Nov 13 2009
Australia's New Defence Policy
Way To Go ‘Oz’ – Australia’s Naval Renaissance
(Reprinted from “Seaways,” Journal of the Nautical Institute, October 2009, pp. 25-26)
Dave Mugridge
After 16 months of careful preparation and stage managed partial disclosures, the orchestrated launch of “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030” declared an apparent security paradigm for the Antipodes. Delivered not to parliament but from the deck of HMAS Stuart, Prime Minister Rudd’s words heralded a more muscular Australia ready to play an increasingly active part in delivering international and regional security. Yet this declaration is from a nation which already contributes more to defence and international security than many of its allies. Allies who have been content to reap the peace dividend from the end of the Cold War or who place endless caveats on foreign military deployments so as to deliver the minimum required for political expediency. So why is Australia blazing a trail that leaves others in its wake?
The recent Australian Defence White Paper (2009) outlined a dramatic transformation to future Australian Defence Force (ADF) force levels and their more active security role on the global stage. This review came about from the realisation that Australia’s position in the world had changed post the Bali bombings and from its contribution to the war in Afghanistan. This new security environment has catapulted her from a benign back-water into a dangerous international arena where future national and international security was very much at stake. So is this a case of cometh the hour cometh the man?
The output from Australia’s defence community has for a long time been coherent with politicians, academics and senior officers all identifying the need for change. For instance, within the maritime domain, the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) Sea Power Centre (SPC) in Canberra has been tirelessly building an enviable reputation as a noteworthy international think-tank. The recent editorial works of Andrew Forbes stand out as good examples of honest, articulate and rigorous analysis.
Many have speculated this more muscular Australia was a response to the rise of China but this observation only addresses one aspect of the new security environment in which she finds herself. Above all, it recognises that in a future world (2030) dominated by the US and increasingly powerful regional powers, such as the BRIC States (Brazil, Russia, India & China), the ADF will need to be more capable of unilateral and independent deployment to guarantee national security. The rise of these regional powers means the US can no longer focus upon just one enemy, instead it will need to constantly juggle and balance its military activities across all areas of the globe. It will become increasingly susceptible to regional alliances and collaboration; a factor which provides a watershed in defence planning for its many allies. The pertinence of this lesson is one that sits uncomfortably in Europe, where a culture of over-reliance on US security guarantees has increased alongside the continuing short-sighted harvest of post Cold War peace dividends.
So, at the dawn of the Asia Pacific Century how right was Canberra to outline a security shift that carefully balances existing military alliances, the new regional economic realities shaped by the rise of these regional powers, and the need to combat non-state terrorism or escalating organised crime? The new policy is an acknowledgement that no matter how strong its alliance with the US is, Australia will have to be more capable in delivering national security alongside an economically weakened, militarily less dominant US. So what does the White Paper mean in terms of new force elements? This table shows the considerable investment in capability the ADF will get. It details the major equipment purchases for each of the three armed services:
| Numbers | Equipment | Suggested Purchase Date | Analysis |
| 12 | Conventional Submarines | 2020-2035 | Replacement for the Collins Class SSK 4000 tonnes Cruise missile armed |
| 8 | New Generation Escorts | 2020-2035 | Replace FFG & ANZAC 5500-7000 tonnes |
| 24 | Maritime Helicopters | Urgent Operational requirement | Advances procurement project slated for 2020 |
| 20 | Offshore Patrol Vessels | 2020-2035 | Multi-role high utility platforms |
| 100 | F-35A JSF | 2015 | Defence Capability Plan (DCP)2006 |
| 7 & 8 | Unmanned MPA & Manned P8 Poseidon | 2018 & 2015 respectively | Unmanned MPA delay from DCP & Manned P-8 already in DCP |
| 36-59 | Artillery Pieces | 2012-2013 | As per DCP and mixture of self propelled and towed pieces up to 155mm |
The RAN will be the main benefactor of this refocus on defence but not to the exclusion of its Army and Air Force siblings. The revised force-structure will allow far greater integration and deliver truly joint effects both on the battle-field and in the management of peacetime security. The envisaged force structure will see Australia lead as the regional military power capable of unilaterally or collectively securing its sphere of influence.
An examination of recent Australian military and academic analysis concerning regional security issues, demonstrates conclusively why Australia has proactively responded as it has done in its Defence White Paper. Strategically the rise of both China and India will be of concern to all in the region. The value of examining these publications is that they put meat on the bone so as to educate and inform those from outside the region of its unique dynamics and cultural nuances. From this comes an acceptance that Australia is not looking to replace the US as the regional power or to threaten the emerging powers but to defend itself and its interests more effectively, more dynamically and at greater range than it can do at this time.
Obviously these outlined strategic changes will remain only an aspiration unless the current political acceptance of their national importance can be retained. Like all aspects of long term defence procurement Australians are hostages to fortune both of defence inflation and election cycles. But, on a positive note, Australia has a dynamism where politicians of all hues accept their international reputation; unlike many of their Western counterparts. They accept that influence comes at a cost and that significant economies must contribute more proportionately to international security. Unforeseen events can change national policies in a heart-beat, but the tone and well considered logic of this White Paper suggests that Australia’s enviable war fighting record will be supported with good equipment and a united national outlook for the generation to come.
The lessons learnt here are particularly appropriate for many western navies as they face the financial rigours associated with losing the relevance argument to overstretched deployed armies. Australia has chosen to look beyond today and its own campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan to recognise that international power projection is more sophisticated than simply boots on the ground. Real international clout comes from having a wide-range of security options that can be employed individually or collectively to secure influence or support the tenets of foreign policy.
In conclusion, this White Paper represents a valuable contribution to the maritime security debate. It illustrates a political elite, defence force and doctrinal heart moving forward with one voice. This is a visionary policy that should be heeded in Europe. Otherwise Europe’s land-centric defence community with its stale doctrine will end up very well prepared for the last war and lose the next by having its head in the mountains of high Asia rather than addressing a deteriorating situation at sea in an increasingly littoral world, dominated by regional maritime powers.
Initial post on May 25 2009 | 3 comments | Last comment on Nov 15 2009
Tuesday, Nov 10 2009
The Future of the Navy
The New Image – a Question of Substance or Style?
Ken Hansen
The Canadian navy is seeking a new image. The navy has launched a public relations ‘blitz’ in conjunction with its 100-year celebrations. The Chief of Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, admitted frankly that “We (the navy) needs to do a better job of explaining our purpose.” The object of the exercise is primarily aimed at attracting more recruits to the naval lifestyle. The problem is that there may be more of an issue here than just public awareness or personnel shortages.
David Pugliese has written that the navy has problems with public relations. In the current issue of Canadian Naval Review (Fall 2009) Stan Week writes “a ‘conversation with the country’ can be a useful part of the strategy development process, but … it would be better to defer that conversation until the Canadian Navy has developed a draft of what the new maritime strategy should say.” In Spring 2009 issue of CNR, an editorial by Dan Middlemiss and an article by Sharon Hobson both lamented the navy’s lack of “a clear language and a coherent, clear and simple public message.” What is the problem?
With an unpopular land war in progress overseas, there would be ample ground for an alternate view of the military dimension to national security. Editorials that question the rationale for interventions are cropping up more and more frequently. Will Canada become ‘gun shy’ as a result? If so, what does that mean for the future? More specifically, what will it mean for the future of the navy?
The naval leadership holds to the argument that it should be renewed in its current destroyer-frigate-submarine format. Is this the best force structure for the future needs of the country? Are there other force structure models and other naval organizations that would fit Canada better in the new security environment? In the interests of beginning a ‘conversation with the country’, Broadsides will launch a series of commentaries in an effort to propose some answers to these questions.
Initial post on Nov 10 2009 | 1 comment | Last comment on Nov 16 2009
Friday, Oct 02 2009
Canadian Naval Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels
Finding a "Parent" Design
Robert J. Whitfield
During my 50+ years in ship design and construction in both Canada and the United States, it was the policy of a new ship design team, when given the operational requirements for a new ship, to review the archives for an existing ship which most closely met the desired operating capabilities. This "parent" design was then carefully reviewed to determine the most cost-effective modifications that could be made to support a design which fully met the new requirements, while minimizing the cost of design and construction changes.
A "parent" design for the Arctic Patrol Vessels that should be carefully considered is the Canadian Coast Guard Type 1100 Icebreaking Buoy Tender. The preliminary design for this class was completed by Saint John Marine Consultants Ltd. in September 1982. In September 1983, contracts were awarded to four Canadian shipyards for the construction of six ships with CCGS Martha L. Black being the first delivered. These ships are 83 meters in length, with 16.2 meters breadth and a depth of 7.75 meters. They feature a twin screw AC/AC integrated electric propulsion system (Canadian General Electric - Peterborough), with an installed power rating of 8,484 kW (7,000 SHP) produced by three diesel generator sets and two 3,500 HP synchronous propulsion motors. They are designed to break two feet of ice continuously at full power, or cruise at 17 knots. They can cruise at 13 knots with two generators on line or 12 knots with one. They have a telescoping helicopter hanger and support a complement of 52.
To meet the speed and volume requirements for a Naval Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessel, it is visualized that the mid-body would be lengthened by 15 meters forward of the superstructure and all buoy handling equipment removed. With modern technology, the installed horsepower could be increased to 10,000 SHP without increasing the volume of the machinery spaces. This could easily be verified by utilizing the original hull test model, modified to the new characteristics, and repeating the original speed/power tests.
Since the Government of Canada already owns the detail design, and Canadian shipyards have experience building to this design, significant cost savings could be realized.
The increased hull volume forward could accommodate a Vertical Launch Missile System module, the smaller of the two carried on a DDG 51, which would provide the ship with an amazing mix of anti-air, anti-ship, anti-sub and anti-missile capability. The fire control system could be data linked to Aegis-type Radar systems installed at high elevations ashore, Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic, which could control several ships of the class.
Initial post on Mar 12 2007 | 21 comments | Last comment on Oct 03 2009
Wednesday, Jun 17 2009
Australia's New Defence Policy
A good example of a national approach for achieving maritime security
Dave Mugridge
The Australian Defence White Paper (2009) is perhaps one of the clearest national statements outlining the need for a comprehensive maritime security strategy. The paper is focused upon joint operations with considerable emphasis placed upon coordination of all aspects of government to deliver national security and identifies the need for a significant upgrade in the national approach to maritime security to achieve this. This is probably the least ambiguous articulation by a foreign state of the 3-D ‘trinity’, which Canada developed for its national security model. In this instance, unlike the Canadian case, there will be real investment in the maritime and amphibious capabilities required to deliver it. Clearly, Australian national security and its maritime sub-set are very much whole-of-government products, with politicians and senior military officers in accord with one another. Wouldn't the clarity of this approach benefit many NATO nations, like the U.K. and Canada, in dealing with the current strategic environment, rather than just coping with out-dated Cold War doctrine?
Initial post on May 25 2009 | 3 comments | Last comment on Nov 15 2009
Wednesday, Jun 17 2009
The New Marine Commando Regiment
Some comments on numbers, names and notional employment
Colonel (Ret'd) Brian Wentzell
Cdr. Ken Hansen has published a thoughtful analysis in Canadian Naval Review and followed it up with the most recent contribution to Broadsides. His analysis suggests that the 250 person Marine Commando Regiment is too small to field and sustain an infantry platoon size force of 32 people. I am not certain that his assertion is entirely correct. It would be instructive to conduct a comparative analysis of the structure and composition of both the JTF2 and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) to determine their operational output. As both units are shrouded in secrecy, such an analysis will not be easily accomplished.
From the scarce information that is publicly available, it seems that the CSOR is intended to have an Operational Company consisting of more than one “Direct Action Platoon.” This platoon will probably be about 32 all ranks. The Operational Company would likely comprise a Headquarters and 2-3 platoons and thus be staffed by 100-135 personnel in all. This would be a Herculean task for a unit of 300 people to sustain. Therefore, one might find, upon analysis of the facts, that the Operational Company can currently only sustain one fully ready platoon with the second platoon being a training organisation and the third being in cadre status.
Like Cdr. Hansen, I also offer a word of caution about the use of the term “regiment.” A regiment means different things in different organisations. In Canada we use the term to describe a single battalion size unit in some situations and in other cases we use the same term to describe a collection of several battalion size units. For example, the Royal Canadian Dragoons is a single battalion size armoured regiment whereas the Royal Canadian Regiment consists of three regular infantry battalions, a regimental training organisation and Militia battalions. The West Nova Scotia Regiment is a single reserve infantry battalion that would usually consist of 150-175 personnel. In the context of the United States Marine Corps the usual marine infantry regiment is comprised of three battalions and more than 3,000 people.
The bottom line is that Cdr. Hansen is probably correct in his assertion that the Marine Commando Regiment can only deploy a single platoon sized unit and this is a very small force. It could be augmented by EOD, diving, engineers and other specialist personnel for specific missions. Methods for deployment would include fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, submarines, surface ships and small boats. The Canadian Forces does not have many of these assets; however, there are sufficient transportation assets to support a priority commitment. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee as to where the commitment might arise and therefore the response may not be either rapid or timely. The creation of an East Coast based platoon, drawn from the Marine Commando Regiment, would ease the domestic response burden but not necessarily the ability to respond to an international problem, such as we experienced in Lebanon or may experience in Sri Lanka or elsewhere.
To my mind, Canada missed a significant opportunity to enhance its sea response by the sinking of HMCS Huron. This ship, like the equally elderly Argentine Type 42 guided missile destroyer ARA Hercules, could have been converted into a fast transport and support ship for the commando force. Hercules carries two Sea King helicopters and rigid inflatable boats. The anti-aircraft missile system is thought to have been removed. It probably supports a platoon size organisation. There is still an opportunity to use one of the remaining Tribal-Class destroyers in the role or task a Halifax-Class frigate, as suggested by Cdr. Hansen. However, the use of one of these ships does not guarantee that she will be in the right place to deal with the crisis that demands Canadian intervention. There is a need, therefore, to consider the procurement of transportation and supporting military resources from trusted allies in situations where our navy cannot arrive on station in a timely fashion to support the deployed commando force.
In conclusion, the creation of the Marine Commando Regiment may have been an act to provide some West Coast capability to support the security of Winter Olympics in 2010. Whether it continues to develop after that date remains to be seen. There are many tasks that it could perform so there is a hope and expectation that it will be allowed to enhance its capabilities and reach full maturity at some point well into the future.
Initial post on Apr 11 2007 | 2 comments | Last comment on Jun 17 2009
Tuesday, May 26 2009
Australia's New Defence Policy
A ‘Hedging Policy’ against Unacceptable Risks
Michael Toohey
It is interesting to see the global reaction to both the Australian White Paper (WP) and our 45% troop increase for Afghanistan.
We are one of the few countries that accept that Defence, unfortunately, is a zero sum game and that on the risk management chart low likelihood (state based conflict) + catastrophic effect (loss of Australian territory/way of life) = medium risk therefore this WP is about openly expressing and funding a hedging policy for the worst case scenario.
It also highlights, unlike NATO, that the United States’ support can not be guaranteed so we aim to be nationally self reliant as much as possible. The conventional deterrence our new subs and air force bring has been described colloquially as the “rip your arm off concept.” That is, even is we lose the other side has been so badly maimed that it becomes a pyrrhic victory for the aggressor!
I'm sure most European countries are probably appalled at such a concept, but the bottom line is the security of the state is the ultimate responsibility a government must provide for its citizens. The Australian Government is not prepared to outsource our Defence.
Initial post on May 25 2009 | 3 comments | Last comment on Nov 15 2009
Monday, May 25 2009
Australia's New Defence Policy
Defence or Offence?
Ken Hansen
Australia's new Defence White Paper was issued at the beginning of May - and the RAN was the big winner. Press reports describe it as "the most dramatic build-up of naval power since World War II, predicated on the belief that the rise of China heralds significant long-term strategic risks for Australia."
A key passage in the same report records: "The white paper all but ignores the conclusions of two spy agencies, the Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organization, which view China's military modernization as a defensive response to US forces in the Pacific rather than as a factor that should drive the structure of the future Australian Defence Force."
Two press reports on the WP and the paper itself can be found here and here.
The White Paper itself is available here.
One analyst likened the new policy as a shift from a purely defensive ("fortress") stance to one of "standoff engagement. Generally, the Australians wish to monitor all foreign activity and sustain a presence on the northern side of the Indonesian archipelago. They also appear to intend projecting Australian military power as far north as possible, even into the South China Sea.
Initial post on May 25 2009 | 3 comments | Last comment on Nov 15 2009
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