The New Marine Commando Regiment
Dave Perry
Amidst the hoopla surrounding the leaked Conservative Canada First Defence Strategy and the subsequent series of articles by David Pugliese, one overlooked item was the proposed creation of a 250 member Marine Commando Regiment (MCR) based in Comox, BC. As described by Pugliese, the MCR will be a dedicated maritime Special Operations Force (SOF), with a primary mission of countering sea-based terrorist incidents. (That the Marine Commando Regiment will in part be designed for rescuing Canadians trapped in war-torn nations accessible by sea is fairly ironic, given that, as Eric Lerhe pointed out previously, the decision to pay off the Protecteur class replenishment ships early will mean these commandos won't be able to rescue anyone using Canadian ships, but I digress...)
The unit's creation was first suggested in June when RAdm Roger Girouard commented that plans were in the works to create a special forces base in BC, although at the time it was thought a SOF unit in BC might be staffed by naval members of JTF2. The creation of a maritime SOF capability comes on the heels of the creation of Canada Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and a new battalion sized Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR).
The new MCR will fill commitments made in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement to provide "supporting maritime forces" for a Special Operations Group. (One of the Transformation initiatives, that is, arguably, actually transformative) Furthermore, this group might help fulfill the Conservative campaign pledge to restore an Army presence in BC, (albeit fudging slightly on the details) and would give the military a standing SOF capability in BC in advance of the 2010 Olympics. Given the ongoing vulnerability of oil platforms, commercial shipping, and our seaports to terrorist threats, a dedicated maritime Special Operation Force unit makes sense. After all, responding to a maritime based terrorist threat would presumably require more than a basic ability to get in and out of boats, so dedicating one force to operating in and on the water seems prudent.
The unit's creation raises several unanswered questions, however.
First, why have a capability on only one side of the country?
Presumably, fiscal restraints allow for the creation of only one unit, and the decision to base the unit in BC makes sense if it is driven primarily by shipping considerations; the west coast boasting a larger volume of commercial shipping. However, if protecting offshore oil platforms is a requirement, the east coast would seem a more appropriate choice. Either way, there surely remains a requirement for a similar capability on Canada's Atlantic Ocean.
Second, what will its relationship be to JTF2?
JTF2 currently has responsibility for maritime counter-terrorism.Will the new MCR take over JTF2's maritime counter-terrorism role? Will it be a "Tier Two" maritime response, with JTF2 remaining Canada's "Tier One" maritime SOF unit? Better yet, what will its relationship be with the Army Pathfinders that were practicing submarine operations last July?
Third, to what extent will the MCR operate out of, and with, submarines?
At the moment, HMCS Victoria, the west coast's lone sub, is not operational, and won't be back online until mid 2009. The east coast, however, features our current operational submarine, HMCS Corner Brook, in addition to HMCS Windsor, the submarine that previously conducted training missions with the aforementioned pathfinders (although the boat is currently out of service). Although it is currently unclear when the MCR will be stood up, the submarine question alone makes the decision to base the unit on the west coast curious.
Fourth, who's paying for all of this?
As Eric Lerhe has pointed out, SOF units don't come cheap, in terms of equipment, personnel and training budgets. Whose budget will this come from, and at the expense of what?
Finally, and perhaps most important, how will this regiment be staffed?
In June 2006, RAdm Girouard described a unit comprised of naval personnel. If this is the case, where will the not-insignificant 250 people come from? As written in the Winter 2007 CNR Editorial, the overall CF personnel situation is murky at best, and the Navy in particular seems hard pressed to retain its current strength. Alternately, the MCR might simply steal some, or all, of JTF2's maritime counter-terrorism personnel. Any of these options must ultimately fit into a rapidly expanding CANSOFCOM, which is slated to expand to 2,300 personnel by the end of the decade (Pugliese, pegs the current size of JTF2 at 600 and the CSOR at over 300, and CANSOFCOM also includes a Special Operations Aviation Squadron and a Joint Nuclear, biological and Chemical Defence Company)
In the current threat environment, SOF have become a hot commodity, and Canada is not alone in expanding is capability. The 2005 US Quadrennial Defence Review calls for across-the-board increases in US SOF units, including a 33% increase in Army Special Forces alone. This has occasioned a minor controversy in professional American military publications, with many repudiating such a rapid increase without a proportional increase in the overall size of the US military. Critics assert this will result in a watering down of the SOF talent pool, especially given recent initiatives to allow direct, off-the-street recruiting into SOF units, rather than selecting from within military ranks.
It remains to be seen how the CF, recently forced to shelve its planned expansion, will be able to find, train and equip 250 highly capable marine commandos.
Some Analysis on Hypothetical Marine Force Plans
Ken Hansen
David Perry’s article, the only one under this discussion topic up until today, remains the most read on the Broadsides forum. In April, Perry’s article set a new mark for popularity by being read by 314 different visitors to the website. Normally, the most-read article would record 50 to 60 ‘hits’ and might be 20 or 30 places higher than the next most-read article. Not this time: it ranked 290 places higher than the second-standing article! Additionally, Perry’s article has never ranked out of the ‘Top Five’ since the forum’s inception almost two years ago.
Based on the popularity of this subject amongst our readers, the most recent CFPS Maritime Security Occasional Paper, the fifteenth in the series, was focused on the issue of Canadian marines. Entitled Marines: Is an amphibious capability relevant for Canada?, the book included three articles that explored the types of marine and naval infantry forces in the world and argued the pros and cons of the concept.
I wrote the lead article, entitled “Marines: Which countries have them and why?” It included a general survey of the 81 countries that have either a marine/naval infantry force, and/or an amphibious capability. Of that number, four states have either marines or naval infantry but do not possess amphibious ships. A further 38 countries with amphibious ships or landing craft have neither marines nor naval infantry. Based on the findings, I described a seven-level typology of marines force structures. One of the recognized types of marine forces is the Special Operations Force (SOF): thirteen states possess such forces and four of them (Ecuador, Israel, Pakistan and Malaysia) have only a marine SOF. This is the type of force Perry recommends for Canada.
After the book, I explored the idea of a Canadian marine SOF, which resulted in an article in the current issue of Canadian Naval Review (Spring 2009), entitled “The Case for Canadian Marines.” The Managing Editor plans to make the article available on the CFPS website in the near future. In the meantime, here are a few comments (from both of my articles) on the idea of a marine commando ‘regiment’ for Canada.
The Conservative government’s proposal (which Perry’s article endorses) is for an anti-terrorist response team to counter threats to people, places and things in the maritime environment where special operating skills are needed that are not normally resident in land forces. In addition, they would be used for boarding uncooperative vessels and to assist in conducting Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). Recent analysis of terror tactics indicates a distinct move to swarming tactics, where the object is to overwhelm sentinel and patrolling security forces with multiple small teams of two or three attackers. The idea is to counter even an immediate response Special Weapons and Tactics Team by presenting too many threats to deal with all at once. The recent attacks in Mumbai and Lahore conformed to this general plan of attack, as have many others.
The ‘problem’ with the current 250-man ‘regiment’ is that is does not provide for the type of dispersed small-unit immediate reaction force that would be of most use to counter this type of threat. The survey data on marine forces indicates that the average marine SOF tactical unit is a 32-person sub-company ‘group’. A 250-man ‘regiment’ (which is a misnomer in any event, since the organization required to generate an average marine regiment is a force of 3,638 people!) is too large and cumbersome an organization for counter-terrorism task. However, the administrative overhead required to organize, generate and sustain a 32-man tactical unit is, adjusted to CF proportions, about 560 people. So, while a marine SOF a very different type of organization, the Canadian theoretical construct is not properly organized or supported. In fact, it represents only about half of what would be needed to support a 32-person marine SOF on both coasts.
What types of ship and craft are needed to support a marine SOF? The survey data show that these ships tend to be smaller and fewer in number (average was one) than typical well-deck or flight-deck equipped ‘amphibs’, but they have the ability to support a relatively high numbers of specialty craft (average total per SOF formation was 30 craft). Keeping the tactical force small and having it capable of dividing into sub-units, which I suggest should be eight people, the 4-element marine SOF can be deployed quickly into a wide variety of existing ships and integrated into an equally wide variety of existing teams (diving, explosive ordinance disposal, boarding and boats crews). Far from suggesting that a ‘Big Honking Ship’ is the place to start, my analysis of the marine SOF concept indicates that a much smaller, faster, and more manoeuvrable amphibious ship is where the CF should concentrate its interests.
In the CNR article, I suggest that the type of ship best suited for the CF in its early exploration of amphibious capability is a modified frigate that draws its inspiration from the destroyer troop transports (APDs) that first came into widespread use during the Second World War. Obsolescent 1000-tonne destroyers and destroyer escorts proved capable of supporting 200 marines, four landing craft, and 20 tonnes of supplies for tasks lasting 48 hours. Today’s 4,770-tonne Halifax-class frigates should be capable of doing at least as well with some modification. With the historical example as a guide, a modified frigate would be able to support even the entire 32-person marine SOF and the army’s only high readiness standby unit, a 100-man augmented company designed for a NEO.
Typically, discussions of amphibious capability for Canada centre on a 25,000- to 50,000-tonne amphibious ship that could move and support an infantry battalion-based landing force. The requirements for support and sustainment often indicate that a multiple ship force is needed to prevent the whole from being exhausted immediately upon landing due to simple logistical culmination. Before getting into a much bigger hypothetical construct that involves power projection with conventional land forces, the more logical approach seems to be the marine SOF. Like Perry, I support the government’s notional proposal, although some adjustments are clearly necessary.
Some comments on numbers, names and notional employment
Colonel (Ret'd) Brian Wentzell
Cdr. Ken Hansen has published a thoughtful analysis in Canadian Naval Review and followed it up with the most recent contribution to Broadsides. His analysis suggests that the 250 person Marine Commando Regiment is too small to field and sustain an infantry platoon size force of 32 people. I am not certain that his assertion is entirely correct. It would be instructive to conduct a comparative analysis of the structure and composition of both the JTF2 and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) to determine their operational output. As both units are shrouded in secrecy, such an analysis will not be easily accomplished.
From the scarce information that is publicly available, it seems that the CSOR is intended to have an Operational Company consisting of more than one “Direct Action Platoon.” This platoon will probably be about 32 all ranks. The Operational Company would likely comprise a Headquarters and 2-3 platoons and thus be staffed by 100-135 personnel in all. This would be a Herculean task for a unit of 300 people to sustain. Therefore, one might find, upon analysis of the facts, that the Operational Company can currently only sustain one fully ready platoon with the second platoon being a training organisation and the third being in cadre status.
Like Cdr. Hansen, I also offer a word of caution about the use of the term “regiment.” A regiment means different things in different organisations. In Canada we use the term to describe a single battalion size unit in some situations and in other cases we use the same term to describe a collection of several battalion size units. For example, the Royal Canadian Dragoons is a single battalion size armoured regiment whereas the Royal Canadian Regiment consists of three regular infantry battalions, a regimental training organisation and Militia battalions. The West Nova Scotia Regiment is a single reserve infantry battalion that would usually consist of 150-175 personnel. In the context of the United States Marine Corps the usual marine infantry regiment is comprised of three battalions and more than 3,000 people.
The bottom line is that Cdr. Hansen is probably correct in his assertion that the Marine Commando Regiment can only deploy a single platoon sized unit and this is a very small force. It could be augmented by EOD, diving, engineers and other specialist personnel for specific missions. Methods for deployment would include fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, submarines, surface ships and small boats. The Canadian Forces does not have many of these assets; however, there are sufficient transportation assets to support a priority commitment. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee as to where the commitment might arise and therefore the response may not be either rapid or timely. The creation of an East Coast based platoon, drawn from the Marine Commando Regiment, would ease the domestic response burden but not necessarily the ability to respond to an international problem, such as we experienced in Lebanon or may experience in Sri Lanka or elsewhere.
To my mind, Canada missed a significant opportunity to enhance its sea response by the sinking of HMCS Huron. This ship, like the equally elderly Argentine Type 42 guided missile destroyer ARA Hercules, could have been converted into a fast transport and support ship for the commando force. Hercules carries two Sea King helicopters and rigid inflatable boats. The anti-aircraft missile system is thought to have been removed. It probably supports a platoon size organisation. There is still an opportunity to use one of the remaining Tribal-Class destroyers in the role or task a Halifax-Class frigate, as suggested by Cdr. Hansen. However, the use of one of these ships does not guarantee that she will be in the right place to deal with the crisis that demands Canadian intervention. There is a need, therefore, to consider the procurement of transportation and supporting military resources from trusted allies in situations where our navy cannot arrive on station in a timely fashion to support the deployed commando force.
In conclusion, the creation of the Marine Commando Regiment may have been an act to provide some West Coast capability to support the security of Winter Olympics in 2010. Whether it continues to develop after that date remains to be seen. There are many tasks that it could perform so there is a hope and expectation that it will be allowed to enhance its capabilities and reach full maturity at some point well into the future.
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